France may soon have a far-right president – and Europe is already scrambling to limit their power | Paul Taylor

European governments have quietly begun adapting their policies for the hitherto unthinkable prospect that France, a founder member of the EU, may elect a far-right nationalist president next year. Germany may be Europe’s biggest economy and most populous state, but nuclear-armed France is the pivotal military power.

More than a year before the French choose a successor to Emmanuel Macron, the possibility of a rightwing populist government in France led by Marine Le Pen or her protege, Jordan Bardella, is keeping policymakers awake in Brussels, Berlin and Kyiv. While European leaders regard Macron with respect (and occasional irritation) as an experienced peer, they are gazing with growing anxiety over his shoulder to see who may follow him in May 2027 and what problems that could pose for the bloc, Nato and Ukraine.

This is prompting some European partners to accelerate negotiations with Paris – on nuclear deterrence, or the next long-term EU budget – in the hope of locking in agreements that a future president will find hard to unpick. For example, eight European partners, including the nuclear-armed UK and seven non-nuclear states, have begun talks to come under France’s “forward nuclear deterrence”. They will join French nuclear exercises and work together on space-based early warning systems, air and missile defence and long-range conventional missiles.

With Iran under bombardment and the Middle East in flames, this is also a hedge against Donald Trump’s erratic presidency and the US strategic pivot away from Europe, which has raised uncertainty about Washington’s commitment to maintaining a nuclear umbrella over the continent. The German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, says he plans to take concrete steps with France before the end of this year, including creating a nuclear strategy steering group and German conventional participation in French nuclear exercises. This would be a huge leap for a country that relied solely on US nuclear protection for decades. Berlin and others are seeking a second insurance policy.

Yet some European leaders are simultaneously cuddling up to alternative allies within the EU – such as Merz’s blossoming cooperation with the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni – or weighing up other fallback solutions in case they can no longer rely on Paris. Some Nordic politicians and intellectuals are contemplating the need for a “Nordic nuke”, and there has been similar talk of nuclear self-reliance in Poland .

This panic makes sense, given the broader political context. After all, the hard-right National Rally party (RN), led by Le Pen, which is favourite to win the next presidential election, insists France’s nuclear deterrent is strictly national and not for sharing with others. Moreover, the RN is anti-free trade, advocating trade barriers and border controls even within the European Union and vehemently opposing any further enlargement of the 27-nation bloc.

That is one reason why Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s strongest supporters in the EU are pushing so hard for Kyiv to join the bloc in 2027 – even without full rights and benefits – to get under the wire before a potential blockade from a Le Pen- or Bardella-led Paris. Under the French constitution, EU enlargement is subject to approval by referendum unless a three-fifths majority of both chambers of parliament endorses it, which is highly improbable under current conditions.

At home, Macron has entered the twilight zone of increasing political weightlessness. He lacks a parliamentary majority and is shackled by a debt burden that denies him the fiscal leeway to walk his bold talk of building European strategic autonomy or providing massive support for Ukraine. When he announced a groundbreaking nuclear policy shift designed to shield European partners earlier this week, one question left unanswered was who would pay for the planned increase in the number of French nuclear weapons.

Barred from seeking re-election after two five-year terms, the president was the first to start hedging against the risk of a Eurosceptic RN sweeping into the Élysée Palace next spring. As insurance, Macron has started placing loyalists in key positions and is planning more appointments that will keep pro-European “adults in the room” long after his term ends.

Last month, he shoehorned his young centrist budget minister, Amélie de Montchalin, 40, into the presidency of France’s court of auditors, an unsackable, open-ended job she could in theory hold for nearly 30 years until mandatory retirement. Her elevation means she will sit in judgment over the high-deficit budget that the minority government just squeezed past a deadlocked parliament. Macron sent her predecessor, former Socialist finance minister Pierre Moscovici, to fill France’s seat on the European court of auditors.

The placement drive extends to the European Central Bank and the Bank of France. ECB president Christine Lagarde is reported to be planning to step down before her term expires in October 2027, giving Macron time to appoint the next French member of the bank’s executive board for eight years. Bank of France governor François Villeroy de Galhau has announced he will retire early to head a charity, vacating another strategic six-year position in national banking supervision and European monetary policy so Macron can pick his successor.

“He’s methodically putting guardrails in place,” said a senior presidential supporter. “All outgoing presidents have rewarded key supporters with plum jobs, but this time it’s different because of the risks before us.”

The prospect of a “rogue France” is also concentrating some minds on settling the forthcoming battle over the EU’s next seven-year budget, which will run from 2028 to 2034. In strident tones reminiscent of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, Bardella has said that if elected, he will go to Brussels and demand France’s money back, seeking a €2bn rebate on Paris’ annual contribution to EU coffers. Brussels officials and the holders of this year’s six-month presidencies of the EU’s council of ministers – Cyprus and Ireland – are pressing for a deal as soon as possible to nail down agreement before the French presidential vote.

• Paul Taylor is a senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre